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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to develop our understanding of the gang aspects of work 
organizations. By applying a psychoanalytic lens, we formulate the ideas of the ‘gang at 
work’ and ‘intra-organizational ganging dynamics’, thereby initiating a research stream on 
the “dark side of groups”. We illustrate our conceptual development by drawing on the Enron 
case thereby contributing unique group-level insights that complement other analyses of the 
phenomenon. We conclude by identifying areas for further research, and arguing that gang 
phenomena may also have been present among many of the key organizations at the centre of 
the credit crisis, such as Lehman Brothers. 
 
Key Words: psychodynamics, ganging, Enron 
 
 
 
  
 The dark side of groups: A ‘gang at work’ in Enron   
3 
 
Over the last few years management scholars have been increasingly focused on the 
“dark side” of various aspects of management and business. Interest areas in this stream 
include: “the dark side of organizational behaviour” (Griffin & O’Leary-Kelly, 2004), “the 
dark side of organizations” (Vaughan, 1999), the “dark side of leadership” (Conger, 1990), 
the “dark side of new organizational forms” (Victor & Stephens, 1994), the “dark side of 
internal capital markets” (Scharfstein & Stein, 2000), “the dark side of social capital” 
(Deuchar, 2008), and the “dark side of high self-esteem” (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 
1996). Although these interest areas are at various levels of analysis, the group-level is 
conspicuous by its absence. We contribute to this stream by focusing on the “dark side of 
groups”, and drawing on the psychodynamics literature, develop two constructs, i.e., the gang 
at work and intra-organizational ganging, which we illustrate using Enron as a case study.  
Much has already been written about the 2001 Enron collapse (Boje, Rosile, Durant, & 
Luhman, 2004; Bryce, 2002; Cruver, 2002; Fox, 2003; Hamilton, 2006; McLean & Elkind, 
2003; Levine, 2005; Partnoy, 2003; Stein, 2007; Swartz & Watkins, 2003), and this new 
study therefore requires some justification. First, as the biggest-ever corporate failure at that 
point in history, Enron is a case of considerable significance and complexity, and we believe 
the understanding of what transpired at Enron is by no means complete. Second, although a 
variety of perspectives have been applied to the Enron case, the group-level has been 
relatively neglected (see O’Connor, 2002 for an exception). We argue in this paper that this 
neglect is particularly unfortunate, and show how group-level aspects played a key role in 
Enron’s demise. Third, we believe the lessons from Enron can be generalized to other ‘dark 
side’ situations including the 2008 credit crisis, and we provide here an indication of some of 
the parallels that exist between these scenarios. 
Our theorizing is built on the Kleinian psychoanalytic theory which distinguishes 
between work groups and gangs (Bion, 1961) and their corresponding group and gang states 
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of mind (Canham, 2002). We are therefore attempting to not only bring a fresh perspective to 
the subject of organizational corruption, but also contribute to extending the boundaries of 
traditional organizational scholarship by introducing concepts from the field of 
psychoanalysis. There has already been some work in this direction, including 
psychodynamic perspectives on organizational identity and learning (Brown & Starkey, 
2000), psychoanalytic views of bureaucratic and postbureaucratic organizations (Styhre, 
2008), psychodynamics of regression in work groups (Diamond & Allcorn, 1987), clinical 
assessment methods in negotiation research (Greenhalgh & Gilkey, 1997), and scholarship on 
the neurotic organization (Kets de Vries & Miller, 1984), psychotic organizations (Sievers, 
1999), and “the organization shadow” (Bowles, 1991; Kociatkiewicz & Kostera, 2010). 
Our paper not only draws on the literature on the psychoanalytic study of organizational 
and social dynamics (Gabriel, 2001; Obholzer & Roberts, 1994), but makes an important 
contribution to it. Our conceptualization of the “gang at work”, and its dynamics in an 
organizational context based on psychoanalytic theory, is analogous to the conceptualization 
of the “dynamics of culture” based on cultural anthropology (Hatch, 1993), and the 
conceptualization of “the dynamics of organizational identity” based on social identity theory 
(Hatch & Schultz, 2002). Even though the group-level is our primary level of analysis, since 
the ‘gang at work’ formation dynamics (which we term ‘intra-organizational ganging 
dynamics’) play themselves out in an organizational context, the organization-level is 
involved as well. This focus on the group- and organization-levels, in that order, makes our 
paper particularly apt for this journal. Our approach is an example of meso-level theorizing, 
in which two or more levels are investigated simultaneously (House, Rousseau, & Thomas-
Hunt, 1995). Other works that have investigated constructs at multiple levels include 
understanding narcissism at individual-, group-, and organization-levels (Brown, 1997), 
anxiety at individual- and organization-levels (Baruch & Lambert, 2007), and 
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counterproductive work behaviour at individual-, group- and organization-levels (O’Boyle, 
Forsyth & O’Boyle, 2011). 
THE PSYCHODYNAMICS OF ‘GANGING’ 
According to Gabriel (2001), psychoanalysis can provide a better understanding of 
organizational phenomena by addressing not just the behavior of individuals in organizations 
but rather the meaning of their behavior and the deeper motives for their actions. In 
particular, the field of psychodynamics has developed psychoanalytic insights into the 
unconscious life of groups and organizations seeking to identify what forces influence group 
functioning (Gabriel, 2001). According to Canham (2002, p. 113), “the psychoanalytic 
approach to understanding group processes tends to use as its basis experience of intra-
psychic processes in the individual”.  
Melanie Klein’s work reframed psychoanalytic thought by suggesting that human 
development was related to different primitive states of mind, each typified by particular 
anxieties and qualities of relationship (Waddell, 1996). Some of these states of mind are 
referred to as ‘perverse’ because they contain elements of negativism, sado-masochism and 
caricature, and are devoted to distortion and attacks on truth (Waddell & Williams, 1991). 
These states of mind are present from birth and persist throughout life, but certain situations 
bring one or another to the fore (Canham, 2002). 
Bion (1961), drawing on this theory, posited that whereas “a constructive, caring and 
creative work group is strived for, the seemingly unbearable emotional discomfort evoked by 
primitive anxieties such as rejection, starvation, annihilation and loss of love causes group 
participants to behave in ways that render this impossible” (Sayder, 2008, p. 115). Building 
on this, psychoanalytic scholars distinguish between a functional group state of mind 
(Canham, 2002), which corresponds to Klein’s (1940 and 1945) description of the depressive 
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position, and its perverse antithesis the gang state of mind (Canham, 2002), which 
corresponds to Klein’s (1946) paranoid-schizoid position. 
 Just as individuals gang together, usually out of insecurity (borne out of feeling 
excluded or different), or out of confusion about who they are and where they belong, so too, 
aspects of the personality gang together, deriving a precarious sense of identity and safety by 
keeping out any overt traces of weakness, uncertainty, or vulnerability (Waddell, 2007). 
Canham uses the term ganging to describe this “gathering together in a malignant huddle of 
parts of the personality” (2002, p. 115), which constitutes the gang state of mind. 
According to Cregeen (2008, p. 176), “in essence, group and gang states of mind may 
be perceived as present within individuals, and within groups, and they reflect and produce 
dynamics intra-psychically and inter-psychically”. One of these inter-psychic dynamics is 
when the gang state of mind sometimes gets exported to the public sphere and leads 
individuals to form an external gang (Waddell & Williams, 1991), which resembles the more 
familiar concept of the “street gang” (Deuchar, 2008), and is the antithesis of the “work 
group” (Bion, 1961), or the “intentional work group” (Diamond & Allcorn, 1987), which has 
a group state of mind.  
According to Sayder (2008), when individuals join a group, intra-psychic parts of those 
involved can express themselves inter-psychically through projective identification (Klein, 
1946). Extensive and extreme use of projective identification results in a flight from the 
individual-level to the group-level where various parts of the self can be externalized into 
various group members (Meltzer, 1979). As parts of the personality are split off, someone 
who has receptivity for that particular characteristic will become a vessel for the projection 
(Sayder, 2008). “As a result, it is common in groups for one person to be singled out as the 
‘the knowledgeable one’, ‘the bossy one’, ‘the irritating one’, ‘the selfish one’, ‘the chatty 
one’ and so on” (Sayder, 2008, p. 115). Because the recipients of these projections are felt to 
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have these characteristics, those doing the projecting unconsciously identify with these 
recipients - hence the term “projective identification”. Both positive and negative traits can 
get projected, rather than recognized and owned (Canham, 2002), but “since it is the most 
disturbed, psychotic parts of ourselves that we find hardest to deal with, these tended to be 
projected primarily into groups” (Segal, 1993, p. 61), and it is the projection of these that 
result in the formation of an external gang.  
 “Whether one is thinking in terms of the internal (i.e. gang state of mind) or external 
gangs, the main objective seems to be one of maintaining a dominant position either by 
inducing in others, or by leaving discarded or marginalized, parts of the self, feelings which 
are too painful to bear, ones which are not felt to be integratable into the personality without 
excessive disruption to the psychic equilibrium” (Waddell, 2007, p. 202). Thus, heroic, 
wanted aspects are projected onto the external gang in general, and the gang leader in 
particular, whereas denigrated, unwanted aspects are projected onto those outside the gang.  
As the leaders are the recipients of the extreme ‘wanted’ and heroic characteristics, they 
become dominant and exercise a “tyrannical hold” (Waddell & Williams, 1991) over gang 
members. This tyranny extends to controlling the gang members to ensure that they “support 
one another in making the criminal destructive work more effective and powerful” 
(Rosenfeld, 1987, p. 111) and “do not desert the destructive organization and join the positive 
parts of the self or betray the secrets of the gang” (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 174). The ‘ganging’ 
process therefore creates an atmosphere of “intimidation, fear or reprisal and a coercion to 
conform” (Canham, 2002, p. 115) and the gang becomes a vehicle for the expression of 
masculine aggression and power (Deuchar, 2008; Murray, 2000; Patrick, 1973). 
The culture generated by the external gang is thus likely to create fractures in 
relationships with other individuals and groups (Canham, 2002). The external gang engages 
in denigrating and attacking, possibly involving acts of “brutal savagery” (Canham, 2002), 
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others outside the gang who undertake more ordinary forms of activity and who are 
concerned with more healthy attempts to survive. This results in the severance of ties (Nitsun, 
1996) and the damaging of the work and activities of these others.  
Once these fractures have been created, the external gang may develop the idea that its 
survival depends on the destruction of these other individuals or groups. This may become an 
idée fixe which the gang becomes obsessed about, and concerning which, it will not relent 
(Canham, 2002, p. 119) and culminates in the destruction of these others. Steiner, for 
example, writes of “gangs [that] are experts in revenge” and promise the “destruction of … 
enemies” (1993, p. 86). While this promise may well be fulfilled, this is undertaken in the 
absence of any awareness of the wider problems, including for the external gang itself, that 
may be created. 
To sum up, ‘ganging’ typically results in the values of the work group being turned 
upside down, such that external appearance, individual success, status and money replace 
internal feelings, co-operative work, friendship and thinking (Canham, 2002). External gangs 
also differ markedly from work groups, in terms of both individual-level aspects (e.g., 
personality, identity, cognition), and group-level aspects (e.g., composition, atmosphere, 
interpersonal concern, function, and leadership), as depicted in Table 1.  
-  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table 1 about here 
          -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
THE ‘GANG AT WORK’ AND INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL GANGING 
In the previous section we delineated the ‘external gang’ based on the psychodynamic 
literature on the ‘gang state of mind’. We now migrate the ‘external gang’ construct to the 
organizational domain by developing the gang at work construct. Further, since 
organizational phenomena are by definition, the result of an interplay among various levels of 
 The dark side of groups: A ‘gang at work’ in Enron   
9 
 
analysis (Rousseau, 1985), we once again draw on the psychodynamics literature on ganging 
to delineate the intra-organizational ganging dynamics conceptualization which involves 
interplay between the group-level (i.e., the gang at work) and the organization-level.  
Gang at work. A ‘gang at work’ is a cohesive group of employees, led by a tyrannical 
leader, who seek to maintain a dominant position in the organization by actively engaging in 
and encouraging “dark side” (i.e., immoral, and/or illegitimate, and/or illegal) behaviours, 
while simultaneously denigrating ordinary and organizationally-healthy behaviours. 
By defining ‘dark side’ behaviors as encompassing one or more categories from three 
(immoral, illegitimate, and illegitimate) we are following the whistleblower literature (Near 
& Miceli, 1985) and toxic leadership literature (Lipman-Blumen, 2005), which take a similar 
approach. Near and Miceli (1985, p. 4) define whistleblowing as “the disclosure by 
organizational members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices” 
(emphasis added). Among the behaviours included under the “toxic leader” construct 
(Lipman-Blumen, 2005, p. 18), are “corruption, hypocrisy, sabotage and manipulation, as 
well as other assorted unethical, illegal, and criminal acts” (emphasis added). Having said 
that, it would be instructive to explore, in future work, the boundary conditions of our 
definition – would just one of these be sufficient or would it require at least two? Based on 
the organizations that we have studied we believe that in gang-at-work situations at least two 
of the three, and typically all three forms of ‘dark side’ behaviors tend to co-occur. 
Intra-organizational ganging dynamics. Based on the psychodynamics literature on 
‘ganging’ and once again reasoning by analogy, we delineate the following five intra-
organizational ganging dynamics: (1) just as individuals gang together out of confusion about 
who they are and where they belong, an organization which does not have a clear and 
coherent identity could leave the space for negative forces to gain ascendance; (2) just as the 
gang derives a precarious sense of identity and safety by keeping out any overt traces of 
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weakness, uncertainty, or vulnerability, organizations which cultivate a masculine, macho 
culture would facilitate the formation of gangs; (3) just as individuals come together in a 
malignant huddle to form a gang headed by a leader, some individual employees may form a 
de facto gang (termed “gang at work”) headed by a gang leader; (4) just as individuals project 
heroic and wanted aspects onto the gang and its leader, while simultaneously projecting 
ordinary and unwanted aspects onto those outside the gang, the ‘gang at work’ projects what 
they consider to be desirable aspects (which are in fact undesirable for the organization) onto 
themselves and their leader, while simultaneously deriding and denigrating the other parts of 
the organization that are engaged in the ordinary aspects (which are in fact healthy for the 
organization); and (5) just as excessive projective identification involves the radical splitting 
into good and bad, the organization develops a schism and gets fractured between the gang at 
work (as well as those bearing allegiance to them) and the rest of the organization, which 
results in adverse consequences such as the decline, and perhaps even death, of the 
organization.  
We have developed our conceptualizations by drawing on psychodynamics literature 
which is at the individual-level and applying them to the group- and organization-levels. 
However, in order to both, reinforce the explanation of our conceptualization, and illustrate 
how they play out in real-life, we apply them here to the Enron case. In our concluding 
“Discussion” section we point out other cases where our conceptualizations would apply. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Our focus on Enron is located within the burgeoning tradition of papers in organization 
and management studies that use text-based research to understand specific cases (Brown, 
2003, 2005; Brown & Jones, 2000; Gephart, 1993; Weick, 1993). Central to this stream of 
work is the notion of man as a story-telling animal who needs to make sense of his life. By 
focusing on human narratives within the context of organizations that can be seen as 
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collective storytelling systems, this paper follows this tradition by presenting “a narrative 
constructed from textual sources” (Brown & Jones, 2000, p. 657). A sub-stream of such text-
based research applies the lens of psychoanalysis to cases, and the present paper follows this 
specific sub-stream (Levine, 2005; Long, 2002: Stein, 2000, 2003, 2007). By using such a 
lens, this paper “adds the further dimension of a deep structure interpretation that draws 
inspiration from a particular theoretical perspective” (Stein, 2007, p. 1405). Psychoanalysis 
provides a particularly useful theoretical perspective because, following Gabriel (2001), and 
as we have already argued, it is especially helpful in facilitating an understanding of the less 
obvious meanings and motivations that underlie human activity. 
A wide range of sources was used in the exploration of the Enron case. Books include a 
work on the history of the gas processing industry (Cannon, 1993); a book by a US academic 
who testified at the Senate’s Enron hearings (Partnoy, 2003); and seven volumes – drawing 
collectively on hundreds of interviews – that focus exclusively on the Enron case (Bryce, 
2002; Cruver, 2002; Eichenwald, 2005; Fox, 2003; Fusaro & Miller, 2002; McLean & 
Elkind, 2003; Swartz & Watkins, 2003). Using keyword searches, a substantial range of 
newspaper articles and academic papers were also located and examined. Journal articles 
included those that view the Enron case from a variety of other perspectives (Benston & 
Hartgraves, 2002; Boje et al., 2004; Currall & Epstein, 2003; Healy & Palepu, 2003; Levine, 
2005; Long, 2002; O’Connor, 2002; Sims & Brinkmann, 2003; Stein, 2007), as well as those 
that shed further light on the role and thoughts of Enron’s whistleblower, Sherron Watkins 
(Beenen & Pinto, 2009; Watkins, 2003). Official reports, databases, and a variety of websites 
were also examined. 
Using these sources, we developed a variety of provisional themes that encapsulated 
key features of the case. Burgess’ (1991) method of distinguishing between substantive 
(observational) notes, analytic notes (concerning preliminary analysis) and methodological 
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notes (concerning impressions) was used. Following Brown, rather than using a quantitative 
analysis, a qualitative approach “highlighting …nuances of meaning” (2003, p. 108) was 
taken. The themes generated were then subject iteratively to several further cycles of 
examination, modification, and refinement (Brown & Jones, 2000; Burgess, 1991). On the 
basis of these themes, five dynamics – that shed light on Enron’s gang-like features – were 
selected for discussion in this paper. Although we believe that the themes used in this paper 
offer an important and credible way to understand the Enron case, we also acknowledge that 
there are other dimensions to the saga and other ways to view what occurred. 
THE ENRON CASE 
Authors and academics from a variety of backgrounds have identified a variety of 
antecedents and mechanisms at various levels of analysis to try and understand what 
happened at Enron. Some of the individual-level factors include: greed (Cruver, 2002; 
Levine, 2005; Partnoy, 2003), hubris (Levine, 2005; Long, 2002), trust (Currall & Epstein, 
2003), and the inclination to undermine external authority (Stein, 2007). At the 
organizational-level, scholars have made the case for corporate governance and financial and 
accounting practices (Benston & Hartgraves, 2002; Healy & Palepu, 2003), incentive systems 
(Healy & Palepu, 2003), ethical failure (du Plessis, 2008), organizational culture (Sims & 
Brinkmann, 2003) and leadership (Sims & Brinkmann, 2003). However, the group-level 
factors have been relatively neglected. An exception is O’Connor’s (2002) analysis of 
groupthink in the Enron boardroom. 
Formed from the merger of Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth (a natural gas pipeline 
company), Enron was created in 1986, with Ken Lay as its Chairman and CEO. Shortly after 
its founding it diversified by creating Enron Oil, a petroleum business. Later, it further 
diversified into other utilities by initiating a number of large ventures in the electricity and 
water industries. Initially, John Wing, head of the massive UK Teesside project, played a key 
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role in Enron’s utility businesses, but in the early 1990s much of the control of the utilities 
was bequeathed to his lover, Rebecca Mark. However, under the influence of Jeffrey Skilling, 
Enron entered the rather different area of trading and finance. With a culture that was closer 
to Wall Street than a traditional utility company, Enron would in due course trade in metals, 
plastics, coal, pulp, paper, weather derivatives and bandwidth capacity.  
As Enron expanded, its recorded profits and revenues soared. In August 2000, Enron’s 
recorded revenues reached a massive $100 billion (almost entirely based on its purported 
revenues in trading), making it the seventh largest company in the Fortune 500. During this 
entire period a wide range of external parties and stakeholders celebrated Enron as one of the 
most promising companies in the US. It was particularly praised as a company with an 
exemplary ‘innovative’ quality: in reality, this ‘innovative’ label masked a situation that was 
chaotic, disorganized and internally highly rivalrous. 
Remarkably, this adulation lasted almost until Enron’s collapse, in December 2001, 
when it filed for bankruptcy. Following the collapse of the firm, CEO Jeffrey Skilling and 
CFO Andrew Fastow were jailed for fraud and other offences for 24 and 6 years respectively. 
Former Chairman Ken Lay was found guilty of 10 counts of securities fraud and related 
charges, and legal experts estimate Lay could have faced 20 to 30 years in prison. However, 
he died of a heart attack before his sentencing, which was scheduled for October 26, 2006. 
The Enron scandal had a significant impact on corporate America and, in an attempt to 
forestall a recurrence, the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, requiring stricter reporting 
standards and other structural changes in publicly owned companies. 
Dynamic 1: The lack of a clear and coherent organizational identity.  
The lack of a clear and coherent organizational identity at Enron manifested itself in 
two ways. Firstly, the organization allowed, if not encouraged, an atmosphere of eccentricity 
and illegitimate behaviors. Secondly, there was organizational hypocrisy (Simons, 2002; 
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Trevino & Brown, 2004) insofar as there was a disconnect between the stated or espoused 
values and actual enacted values. 
Eccentricity and illegitimacy: An atmosphere was engendered at Enron whereby “being 
ordinary was the kiss of death” (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 190). For example, Ken Rice, 
head of Enron Broadband Services, was reputed to have watched cartoons during meetings, 
encouraging others to watch as well (Bryce, 2002), and was out racing his cars when he 
should have been in the office preparing for Enron’s crucial annual conference (Bryce, 2002). 
Then there was Andrew Fastow, whose pranks included driving a small remote-controlled car 
up the legs of female colleagues (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 73). Jeffrey Skilling, who “had 
an instinct for misfits …[and]…was untroubled by eccentricity” (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 
57), also paraded his own eccentricity by cultivating the image of Darth Vader, the iconic 
Star Wars villain, dressing as him at company functions, and decorating his mansion in the 
black and white of the Darth Vader style (Boje et al., 2004). Indeed, Enron was full of Star 
Wars imagery, with a key deal being named JEDI, a partnership being called Chewco, and 
business entities being named Kenobe Inc and Obi-1 Holdings.  
Organizational hypocrisy: Enron’s statement of ‘Vision and Values’ comprised four 
principles, the first of which was ‘respect’ and the second ‘integrity’ (the others being 
‘communication’ and ‘excellence’). ‘Integrity’ and ‘respect’, the top two espoused values, 
were being steadily undermined and contradicted, and this indicates that the actual values 
were different. The real core values were that immoral, illegitimate, and illegal activities were 
tolerated, if not downright encouraged. 
While much of what happened at Enron undermined the core value of ‘respect’, the 
behaviour of Jeffrey Skilling was emblematic of it. Following a conference call comment by 
Richard Grubman of Highfields Capital Management that Enron was the only financial 
institution not to provide a balance sheet or cash flow statement, Skilling – in the earshot of 
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investors and Enron staff alike – responded “Well, thank you very much. We appreciate that, 
asshole” (Cruver, 2002, p. 54 – emphasis added). Then, having deliberately plundered the 
energy markets and engineered an energy crisis in California that led to rolling black-outs and 
enormous hardship for its residents, Skilling made a notorious hypocritical press conference 
joke – that the difference between California and the Titanic was “at least the lights were on 
when the Titanic went down” (McLean & Elkind, 2003, p. 281). 
As far as ‘integrity’ is concerned, Enron’s history is riddled with questionable events 
and decisions including the use of fraudster Michael Milken to underwrite Enron’s debt, and 
the continuation of employment of the traders and convicted felons, Borget and Mastroeni. 
Lay kept Borget and Mastroeni on the Enron payroll because “he need[ed] their earnings” 
(Bryce, 2002, p. 39). Further, following their conviction, Mick Seidl, Lay’s close friend and 
former number two, sent them a telex thanking them for their perseverance and imploring 
them to “[p]lease keep making us millions” (McLean & Elkind, 2003, p. 20). These actions 
signaled to the rest of Enron that lack of integrity was not punished, but in fact rewarded.  
A more direct cue came from Lay’s insistence that all Enron travel be booked through 
his sister’s firm, earning her vast amounts of money. Sherron Watkins, Enron’s 
whistleblower, who worked for Andy Fastow, commented: “In some perverse way, Andy 
Fastow might have justified his behaviour by saying to himself, ‘…Why can’t I just take a 
little for myself, just like Lay has been taking a little Enron money and transferring it to his 
sister for all these years?’” (Watkins, 2003, p. 123). 
Dynamic 2: The engendering of a masculine, macho culture which disowned weakness, 
uncertainty, and vulnerability. 
Enron had an extremely masculine, macho culture. One manifestation was in its highly 
competitive culture where, rather than managing conflict (Tekleab, Quigley & Tesluk, 2009), 
there appeared to be an active attempt to provoke it. In particular, Enron’s performance 
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review system, involving all managers giving and receiving 360-degree feedback on a 6-
monthly basis, was explicitly designed and used to get rid of unwanted people (Swartz & 
Watkins, 2003). The performance review system – “a Jeff Skilling thing” (Cruver, 2002, p. 
63) – resulted in the bottom 15 per cent heading off to “redeployment land… or … Siberia” 
(Cruver, 2002, p. 63), which referred to an area of desks, where they were tasked, within the 
following few weeks, to find a new job within or outside of Enron. 
There was also evidence of aggressiveness both with regard to financial planning and in 
a physical sense. According to Sherron Watkins, Andy Fastow “didn’t have a risk-control 
bone in his body” (McLean & Elkind 2003, p. 140), but this did not prevent him from 
becoming Enron’s CFO. Fastow is also reputed to have yelled out obscenities in meetings 
(Bryce, 2002, p. 202) and to have had “tirades [that were] … interminable” (Swartz & 
Watkins, 2003, p. 74). John Wing, head of the Teesside project, was also an extreme 
character who has been described as “volcanic” (McLean & Elkind, 2003, p. 44), “crazy” and 
“loud and profane” (Bryce, 2002, p. 71). As Wing himself acknowledged, “[e]veryone I’ve 
worked with, I’ve sledgehammered a bunch of times” (quoted in McLean and Elkind, 2003, 
p. 51). On one occasion, Wing threatened to blow up the car of an accountant because he was 
slow to pay his expenses (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, pp. 36-7). Wing’s behaviour included 
“screaming fits that were designed to intimidate” (Bryce, 2002, p. 70), as well as telling 
anyone who did not measure up that he was a “pencil dick” (Bryce, 2002, p. 70). 
The highly masculine, aggressive culture at Enron was also supported by a range of 
“macho” activities that were regularly organized by the company, some of which took on a 
mythic status in its culture. Hosted by Skilling, these included “extreme adventures … 
bungee jumping, rock climbing, Jeep races through the desert” (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 
111), paintball wars and “daredevil expeditions to the Australian outback; to Baja, Mexico; 
and to the glaciers of Patagonia” (McLean & Elkind, 2003, p. 122) where, according to Ken 
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Rice, the goal was to find an adventure “where someone could actually get killed” (quoted in 
McLean & Elkind, 2003, p. 122).  
The “boys club” atmosphere was also manifested in that sexual misconduct was not 
only acceptable but widespread within the firm. Although sexual misconduct in the 
workplace is not unusual, at Enron it was said to be “like a humidifier ….in the air”, 
according to one executive (quoted in Bryce, 2002, p. 145). Enron’s leaders – such as Ken 
Lay, Jeff Skilling, Rich Kinder, Lou Pai, Ken Rice and John Wing – engaged in extra-marital 
relationships with Enron women, with many of these being multiple and flagrant affairs that 
set a tone that infidelity was the norm. “Even married traders and executives”, reports Fox, 
“boasted of womanizing” (2003, p. 93). Ken Rice not only bragged about his infidelities 
(Bryce, 2002, p. 145), but reputedly questioned a newly-married colleague about why he had 
not cheated on his wife yet (Bryce, 2002, p. 146).  
Another aspect of the macho culture was the use of “Hottie Boards” and the “Women 
of Enron Calendar” that involved, for example, yelling out “August” when “Miss August” 
appeared (Cruver, 2002, p. 38). Strip-clubs were regularly used as luncheon and dinner 
venues (often charged to Enron as expenses). Lou Pai, Chairman of Enron Energy Services, 
regularly took Enron traders on company funded visits to Houston’s strip-clubs, and was once 
caught bringing strippers into Enron premises (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 81); it is alleged 
that he even had sex with the strippers on Enron’s conference table (Bryce, 2002, p. 146). 
Dynamic 3: The emergence of the “gang at work” and its leader.  
Although Ken Lay’s leadership was not exemplary, the key driver of the practices that 
killed Enron was not him, but rather Skilling. Skilling had, to quote one colleague, 
“tremendous juice within the company” (Bryce, 2002, p. 58), and “played a dominant role in 
steering the company along a path which involved persuading, cajoling, evading or 
corrupting its regulatory authorities” (Stein, 2007, p. 1403). Indeed, under the “Reign of 
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Skilling” (Bryce, 2002, p. 120), the culture at Enron was powerfully shaped, and its identity 
activated (Riantoputra, 2010), so that its prevailing ethos was consistent with his character. 
Skilling’s fascination with Darth Vader (the leader of the ‘dark side of the force’ and a 
specialist in destruction) does not appear to be accidental. Thus, under Skilling’s leadership, a 
‘gang at work’ – including Ken Lay, Lou Pai, Andy Fastow, Ken Rice and John Wing – was 
formed. This group was kept together by the promise of substantial reward on the one hand, 
and brutal punishment on the other.  
On the one hand, Skilling “promoted his closest cronies … to top spots in the 
company” (Bryce, 2002, p. 137-8) and lavished them with vast salaries, bonuses and 
extraordinary expense accounts. Further, in a company that was akin to “a French court under 
Louis the Fourteenth” (Bryce, 2002, p. 145), mistresses were given rapid promotions – with 
associated bonuses and expense accounts – to the highest echelons of the company. 
On the other hand, the gang had a savage side that sent a strong message to members 
not to dissent. In particular, Skilling’s intimidating leadership style strongly stifled 
questioning and opposition. “If you were going to ask a bunch of questions, he would 
intimidate you and make you feel you were not smart enough to get it. You are either in our 
smart guy club or not. That is how he suckered people in. ‘Ah! You are smart like me’” 
(Beenen & Pinto, 2009, p. 279). Further, the power of the Performance Review Committee 
(PRC) and the associated 360 degree feedback led to a situation where, whatever misgivings 
employees may have about a deal, they should “not stand in front of a deal because [they] 
could get killed in the PRC” (Bryce, 2002, p. 131). Skilling’s acolytes replicated his brutal 
ways, with John Wing, for example, intimidating his subordinates into line by firing each of 
them “at least ten times” (McLean & Elkind, 2003, p. 51). Even trusted employees were told 
that they were failures, stripped of their titles, or made to report to someone junior, so that 
abusive supervision (Wu & Hu, 2009) was widespread.  
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The bonding of the gang was strengthened by a deep adulation for Skilling, who 
“engendered a kind of loyalty that … was almost cultlike” (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 57). 
One executive, for example, described him as the “smartest son of a bitch I’ve ever met” 
(Bryce, 2002, p. 44); Mark Palmer, Enron’s head of PR, exclaimed that he was “long [on] 
Jeff Skilling” (McLean & Elkind, 2003, p. 349); while CFO Andy Fastow even went as far as 
naming his first son after Skilling (McLean & Elkind, 2003, p. 139). 
Dynamic 4: The projection of the wanted aspects onto the “asset-light” business and 
the unwanted aspects onto the “asset-heavy” business. 
At the outset, Enron and its predecessor companies (Houston Natural Gas and 
InterNorth) were quintessentially asset-heavy utilities, and their core competence (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990) lay in this area. With the exception of the period when the US government and 
its regulatory authorities had caused major problems in the gas industry (Cannon, 1993; 
MacAvoy, 2000; Stein, 2007), the asset-heavy utilities were “Enron’s cash cow” (Bryce, 
2002, p. 116) with Enron Oil and Gas being “one of its best-run and most reliable businesses” 
(Bryce 2002, p. 288).  
However, all this changed with the arrival in 1990 of Jeffrey Skilling. Skilling joined to 
create the asset-light Gas Bank, a brilliant financial innovation that functioned as a new 
market mechanism between gas producers and consumers. As Bryce puts it, “[t]he Gas Bank 
was a smash … [and] a turning point for Enron” (2002, pp. 54-5), heralding the beginning of 
a major shift towards asset-light trading. Skilling then used the Gas Bank and related 
initiatives to try to persuade Enron that it could overcome several of its problems by re-
inventing itself as a financial services company.  
Enron’s response was to embrace this new approach, but not – a point overlooked by a 
number of authors – to diminish the asset-heavy approach: instead, it engendered a highly 
competitive rivalry between the two. Specifically, from the early 1990s there were two 
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competing approaches in the company: the traditional ‘asset-heavy’ approach, involving the 
ownership of physical heavy assets, headed largely by Rebecca Mark, and ‘asset-light’ 
trading, headed by Jeff Skilling. 
However, enthused by the exciting world of trading, and Skilling’s aura of invincibility, 
unconscious splitting took place whereby a perception was generated according to which the 
wanted aspects of the organization were progressively seen to be associated with the asset-
light business, while the unwanted aspects were projected onto the asset-heavy business. 
Thus, in spite of Enron’s success being largely associated with its work in utilities, and in 
spite of much of its expertise lying in this area, the asset-heavy business was increasingly 
viewed as problematic and disdainful. According to Swartz and Watkins, “the word pipeline 
seemed like an embarrassment” in Enron’s 1999 Annual Report (2003, p. 177). As Bryce 
argues, pipelines and pipeliners became Enron’s “ugly stepchildren” (2002, p. 123), with 
methods – especially Enron’s performance review system – being used to get rid of pipeline 
“deadwood” (Swartz & Watkins, 2003). The problem was that utilities, and gas pipeline 
companies in particular, were viewed as “stodgy” (Swartz & Watkins, 2003), “boring” 
(Bryce, 2002), “colorless” (Swartz & Watkins, 2003) and “dirty and dull” (Partnoy, 2003). 
The splitting process was exacerbated by Skilling’s use of highly immodest 
descriptions of the asset-light aspects of the business, frequently proclaiming that the 
increasingly asset-light Enron was “on the side of the angels” (Swartz & Watkins, 2003, p. 
65), and arguing that “[w]e’re up here – and everybody else is down there” (McLean & 
Elkind, 2003, p. 241). This led to Enron engaging in a massive shift towards trading, almost 
doubling both capital expenditure and long–term debt during 1997 (Bryce, 2002, p. 133), and 
dramatically increasing employee numbers from 7,500 in 1996 to 20,600 in 2000, largely in 
the area of trading (Bryce, 2002, p. 134). Such increases were extraordinary not only because 
many of Enron’s trading ventures (such as broadband) were in areas that were largely 
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unknown, but because the wider context of trading was, and remains, highly vulnerable to 
“normal accidents” (Perrow, 1999) and disaster (Hirschhorn, 1997). 
Dynamic 5: The fracturing of the organization into “asset-heavy” and “asset-light”. 
Competition between asset-heavy and asset-light was exacerbated by a highly personal 
conflict between their leaders, with Skilling and Mark being the same age, both Harvard 
Business School graduates, highly ambitious, and wanting the top job at Enron. By the mid-
1990s, the leaders of the two approaches were arch-enemies: as Fox puts it, Mark was “the 
personification of the asset-heavy philosophy, juxtaposed against Skilling’s asset-light 
philosophy … the two divisions were competing for the soul of Enron” (2003, p. 58).  
Matters came to a head in November 1996 with the resignation of Rich Kinder, Chief 
Operating Officer (COO), a pipeline man and the “embodiment of the ‘old economy’” 
(Fusaro & Miller, 2002, p. 57), also known as “’Doctor Discipline’ …[because of]…his 
obsession with cash and cash flow” (Bryce, 2002, pp. 112-4). When Skilling was appointed 
as COO, Mark is reputed to have been furious, storming out of a meeting with Ken Lay 
(McLean & Elkind, 2003, pp. 110-1). Skilling had neither Kinder’s commitment to asset-
heavy industry nor his caution to inhibit him.  
Skilling would “attack, attack, attack” Mark (McLean & Elkind, 2003, p. 255), show 
feelings of contempt towards her (Eichenwald, 2005, p. 361), and frequently referred to her 
work as a “mess” (McLean & Elkind, 2003, p. 260). Throughout his time at Enron, he also 
made more general comments disparaging the asset-heavy focus of other utility companies. 
While the explicit targets of Skilling’s attacks were asset-heavy firms like Exxon, it is clear 
that, by implication, they were also directed at Rebecca Mark and the asset-heavy part of 
Enron. As a result, by August 1999, around the time of Skilling’s promotion to CEO, Enron 
had “withdrawn entirely from oil and natural-gas production” (Partnoy, 2003, p. 307), selling 
its stake in Enron Oil and Gas for approximately $600 million. 
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When, in August 2000, Mark finally tendered her resignation, Skilling could not hide 
his sense of satisfaction: what happened with Mark’s asset-heavy work, he asserted, was 
“probably good … it was absolutely clear it was not the direction to go” (McLean & Elkind, 
2003, p. 246 – emphasis added). While it is true that Mark’s projects had yielded losses, the 
implication that his asset-light option was better was entirely illusory, buoyed up by mark-to-
market accounting and a variety of dishonest and illegal practices. Yet, Skilling believed that 
asset-light trading could not go wrong, and, consequently, no limits or constraints should be 
placed on it. Following Mark’s departure, Skilling kept further diminishing the asset-heavy 
business, and substantially increasing asset-light risk-taking, so that by the end of 2000, the 
notional value of Enron’s derivatives were a staggering $758 billion (Bryce, 2002, p. 242). 
In the end, the unraveling of Enron occurred very quickly. Its risks were substantially 
increased by the highly dangerous terms of some of its loans: when, for example, the 
company was downgraded by the credit rating agencies to below investment grade, it and its 
partnerships immediately owed over four and a half billion dollars (Partnoy, 2003, p. 336). 
By the time of Enron’s bankruptcy, its derivatives liabilities exceeded $18.7 billion: as Bryce 
argues, this “played a key role in pushing the company into bankruptcy” (2002, p. 6). We 
summarize the intra-organizational dynamics at Enron in Table 2. 
-  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table 2 about here 
         -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper we have attempted to enrich mainstream theorizing on the “dark side of 
organizations” in general, and corruption in particular, by conceptual development of the 
‘gang at work’ and ‘intra-organizational ganging dynamics’ based on psychoanalytic 
theories. In so doing, we have addressed the group-level lacuna both with regard to the ‘dark 
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side’ literature stream and the burgeoning Enron-related research stream, as well as 
contributing to the psychoanalytic literature on organizational and social dynamics. 
Although we have bounded our conceptual development to intra-organizational gangs 
and ganging dynamics, future work can consider extending this approach to gangs that work 
across organizations (cf. illegal networks; Baker & Faulkner, 1993) and extra-organizational 
ganging dynamics. There is data that suggests these aspects were at play as well at Enron. 
According to whistleblower Sherron Watkins Enron’s legal counsel Vinson & Elkins, 
auditors Arthur Andersen, and consultants McKinsey & Co., were all in cahoots with Enron’s 
top brass in powerful and highly dangerous ways (Beenen & Pinto, 2009). Whether these 
across organizational relationships are cohesive enough for the individuals involved to be 
considered a “gang at work”, could be explored in future work. If they are, then the 
delineation of the ganging dynamics would necessarily be different from the intra-
organizational ones we have delineated here (since the first two are organization-specific). 
This paper also has implications for our understanding of organizational identity, 
understood as that which is relatively stable and enduring in an organization (Albert & 
Whetten, 1985), and that involves the creation of an ensemble of action dispositions regularly 
undertaken (Birnholtz, Cohen, & Hoch, 2007). The subject of organizational identity has 
been studied both from a psychodynamics perspective (Brown & Starkey, 2000) and from a 
metaphor-approach to theorizing (Cornelissen, 2006). Brown (1997) argued that groups and 
organizations use ego defences to ameliorate anxiety and maintain the continuity of existing 
organizational identity, whereas Brown and Starkey (2000) have emphasized how such 
defences may be dysfunctional when they militate against appropriate organizational change. 
Future work could examine how the group-level ganging dynamics interact with, and impact, 
identity dynamics at the organizational level (Hatch & Schultz, 2002). 
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Our paper complements work on organizations that make strong efforts to narrate a 
clear organizational identity in the pursuit of organizational legitimacy (He & Baruch, 2010) 
by examining an organization in which there is a lack of a coherent identity and the 
establishment of an atmosphere of eccentricity and illegitimacy. Our paper also builds on 
work that argues that organizational identity may be somewhat more fluid than hitherto 
thought (Gioia, Schultz & Corley, 2000; He & Baruch, 2009) and that organizations may 
have multiple identities (Pratt & Foreman, 2000). We show how an organization 
characterized by a gang culture may be made up by different parts with their own competing 
identities, and go on to argue that a gang leader may attempt to destroy those parts associated 
with one identity, while boosting and entrenching those parts associated with another. This 
complements the themes of organizational identity formation and maintenance (Birnholtz et 
al., 2007; Riantoputra, 2010) by illuminating the processes and dynamics connected with 
their converse, that of organizational identity destruction. This also has specific connections 
with the understanding of key decision moments, which, as Riantoputra (2010) has shown, 
are used by senior people to activate positive organizational identity concepts. Our paper also 
shows that key decision moments – such as Jeffrey Skilling’s decision to diminish Enron’s 
utility businesses around the time of Rebecca Mark’s departure – may be used as a platform 
to erode an organizational identity concept, once again the converse of organizational identity 
activation and maintenance. In our analysis, the rivalry between Jeff Skilling and Rebecca 
Mark was a by-product of the ganging dynamics. However, this aspect of “competitive wars” 
(Rindova, Becerra, & Contardo, 2004) and “the psychology of rivalry” (Kilduff, Elfenbein, & 
Staw, 2010) is gaining currency, particularly when leaders disagree about organizational 
identity (Voss, Cable, &Voss, 2006).  
This paper also has implications for the wide range of debates about organizational 
crisis and risk, so diverse that, in a landmark UK Royal Society report on risk, they have been 
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referred to as the “risk archipelago” (Hood, Jones, Pidgeon, Turner, & Gibson, 1992, p. 135). 
Although these debates focus on a variety of issues, one central concern has been the 
“incubation period” (Turner, 1976; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) of organizational crises, 
collapse and disaster. While many of the debates concerning the incubation and prevention of 
crisis and disaster – especially those relating to the ‘homeostatic’ approach (Hood, & Jones, 
1996, p. 206) – pivot on the use of quantitative data, the Enron case shows the importance of 
qualitative factors in the management of risk. Specifically, understanding the organization’s 
culture, including recognizing its fault lines and the nature of its leadership, involves 
qualitative matters that cannot be made sense of using numbers and that have few if any 
direct quantitative correlates. It is also striking that the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, inspired by 
widespread risk management concerns in the wake of the Enron collapse, seems to have done 
little to help the situation. Indeed, as du Plessis (2008) has argued, by focusing on changes to 
roles and procedures, the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation enacted an “agency logic” that militated 
against the possibility of effective learning. Following Elliott and Macpherson (2010), one 
could take this theme further by arguing that the “lessons learnt” from the Enron crisis were 
simply institutionalized by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act so that the real issues – which were about 
gang culture and leadership – were obfuscated. Any more thorough learning was thus not 
possible, paving the way for the conditions that led to the 2008 credit crisis. 
This then leads on to a further set of implications, those concerning our understanding 
of the organizations that were at the centre of the global financial crisis. In particular, at 
Lehman Brothers, whose September 2008 collapse triggered the crisis, gang-like features had 
been present for a substantial period of time. Long-running feuds between the trading and 
merchant bank factions during the decade 1983-1993 sustained a culture that was 
“notoriously fractious... [and]... defined by its internecine warfare” (Serwer, 2006), one that 
came close to destroying it (Auletta, 1986). In 1993 Dick Fuld, the “Bruiser of Wall Street” 
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(Bawden, 2008), also known as “‘The Gorilla’ for his intimidating presence” (Plumb & 
Wilchins, 2008) took over as CEO and Chairman. Fuld was able to quell some of the 
factional conflict, but only by “intimidating everyone and wresting power through acts of 
sheer will” (Partnoy, 2008). Fuld’s “pugnacious” (Sender, Guerrera, Larsen, & Silverman, 
2008) and “combative” (Serwer, 2006) style was well known, and set a highly damaging and 
macho tone in the company. 
While Fuld played the central role in taking on dangerous risks and creating 
vulnerabilities at Lehman, he laid the blame for the company’s problems elsewhere, firing his 
successor Joe Gregory and CFO Erin Callan in June 2008. He also spent a great deal of 
energy blaming short sellers for Lehman’s problems, but his “crusade [against the short 
sellers] … only served to confirm the anxieties of [his] critics” (Sender et al., 2008). At a 
spring 2008 conference of Lehman managing directors in London, Fuld declared that, if he 
found a short seller working against Lehman, he would want to “tear his heart out and eat it 
before his eyes while he is still alive” (quoted in Stern, 2009). It was Fuld’s need to blame 
others rather than address the problems Lehman had created for itself – as well as his hubris 
and highly aggressive macho style – that prevented him from avoiding what would become 
the largest financial collapse in history. These gang-like features of Lehman Brothers suggest 
that it could usefully be explored in future work, using the concepts developed in this paper.   
It is also clear that gang-like features in the organizations involved in the credit crisis 
were by no means confined to Lehman Brothers. Fracturing, for example, was a central 
feature of Citigroup, the world’s largest bank that, following calamitous losses during the 
2008 credit crisis, received hundreds of billions of dollars as part of a US Federal bailout 
package. Citigroup was a highly divided organization created in 1998 in what “is regarded by 
some as one of the worst mergers of all time” (Dash, 2008), and has been described as a 
“behemoth ….[that]…seems to lumber from one crisis to another …[and was characterized 
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by] …political infighting” (Dash, 2008). If fracturing was present at Citigroup, Jeffrey 
Skilling-like gang leadership was present at Bear Stearns, the company whose March 2008 
collapse levered the global economy into the early phases of the credit crisis. Specifically, 
Bear Stearns’ CEO James Cayne was known to be a “maverick” (Kelly, 2007) who, for 
example, branded those who crossed him as “cocks” and “bully pricks” (Economist, 2009). 
Over 10 critical days in July 2007 when two of Bear hedge funds collapsed, Cayne was 
playing in a bridge tournament in Nashville “without a cellphone or an email device” (Kelly, 
2007). Cayne’s bizarre behaviour has been seen to have played a significant role in Bear 
Stearns’ demise. While a systematic study of these and other organizations involved in the 
credit crisis lies beyond the scope of this paper, our preliminary investigations into their 
gang-like features suggest that this could be a fruitful area of exploration. 
 The gang at work and intra-organizational ganging dynamics constructs may also be 
relevant to the psychology, psychodynamics, and political science literatures which have 
studied related “dark side” topics such as bullying (Waddell, 2007), psychotic organizations 
(Sievers, 1999), high toxicity leadership (Goldman, 2006), internal terrorists (Van Fleet & 
Van Fleet, 2006) and “guerilla groups” (Zawodny, 1962). 
Our hope is that this paper draws attention to the field of psychodynamics and how the 
organizational manifestation of unconscious processes could result in the formation of 
“gangs-at-work”, which inevitably contribute to negative consequences for organizations, 
employees, and investors, to name just a few key stakeholders. Practicing managers in 
general, and senior managers in particular, could be alerted to these dynamics and nip them in 
the bud, thereby inhibiting their role in the decline and death of organizations, and preventing 
enormous negative social and economic consequences.    
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Table 1: Comparison between “Work group” and “External Gang” 
 Work groups  External Gangs  
Individual-level/ State of mind 
State of mind Group state of mind  Gang state of mind; Basic 
assumption mentality  
Psychoanalytic position Depressive  Paranoid-schizoid  
Personality aspects Individuals able to acknowledge 
and own different aspects of their 
personality without splitting these 
off  
Gathering of certain parts of the 
self or personality in a malignant 
huddle  
Projective processes Minimal  Excessive  
Identity Capacity to know honestly who you 
are and to recognize that the self 
comprises a multiplicity of aspects  
Identification with destructive 
narcissistic part of the self  
Cognition Capacity to reflect, to think 
symbolically  
Under the sway of anxious states, 
inability to think rationally, 
reflectively or symbolically  
Group-level 
Atmosphere Benevolent: Can tolerate, explore 
and value difference, alternative 
viewpoints and the tensions and 
potential for creativity these throw 
up 
Malevolent: Under pressure of 
anxiety, perceived or real threats 
Interpersonal concern Concern among members for one 
another  
Concern only for members of the 
gang, and hatred for those outside 
the gang  
Composition Need for a mix of people with 
different qualities in order for 
multiplicity of perspectives 
One of the notable characteristics of 
gangs is that the individuals in it 
behave like a single organism 
Function Forum in which individual 
members can explore themselves 
through one another’s experience of 
being with them  
Pulling away from freedom, 
individuality, intimacy and 
aesthetic sensibility, into the 
mindlessness of group conformity  
Main aims Cooperative work, friendship, and 
thinking 
To prevent the weakening of the 
gang and to control members so 
that they will not desert the gang 
and join the positive parts of the 
self or betray the gang’s secrets 
Affect Pleasure in being member of the 
group and for being known for who 
they really are 
Struggle between destructive and 
libidinal impulses  
Leadership Authority figures who maintain a 
thoughtful and considerate attitude 
towards all those for whom they 
have responsibility  
Submission to tyranny by a leader 
who controls all the gang members 
to ensure that they support one 
another in making the criminal 
destructive work more effective and 
powerful  
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Table 2: Comparison between the “External Gang” and the  
“Gang at work” (illustrations from Enron case) 
 
 External Gang Gang at work 
Definition Individuals come together for a variety 
of social and psychological reasons 
(e.g., group identity, excitement from 
the expression of masculine aggression) 
and engage in a wide range of activities 
alongside criminal ones 
Cohesive group of individuals, led by a 
tyrannical leader, who seek to maintain 
a dominant position in the organization 
by actively engaging in, and 
encouraging, “dark side” behaviours, 
while simultaneously denigrating 
ordinary and organizationally-healthy 
behaviours 
Located in Society Organization (Enron) 
Bounded by Territory (e.g. “street gangs)” Organization (Enron) 
Members Individuals Individual employees (Enron senior 
management) 
Dynamic 1  -
“incoherence” 
Insecurity, not knowing who they are 
and where they belong 
Lack of clear and coherent 
organizational identity (hypocrisy, 
eccentricity) 
Dynamic 2 - 
“macho identity” 
Derive precarious sense of identity and 
safety by keeping out any overt traces 
of weakness, uncertainty, or 
vulnerability 
Masculine, macho culture which keeps 
out any overt traces of weakness, 
uncertainty, or vulnerability (highly 
competitive, use of “strippers” and 
“prostitutes”, aggressive behaviour and 
financial risk-taking) 
Dynamic 3 - 
“gang 
emergence” 
Formation of the gang headed by a 
leader 
Formation of a ‘gang at work’ (Lay, 
Fastow, Wing, etc.) headed by a leader 
(Skilling) 
Dynamic 4 - 
“projecting” 
Project wanted aspects within the gang 
and unwanted aspects outside the gang 
Project macho, aggressive, eccentric, 
organizational damaging aspects within 
the gang and denigrate unwanted 
ordinary, organizational-healthy aspects 
to the rest of the organization (“ugly 
step-children”) 
Dynamic 5 - 
“fracturing” 
Excessive projecting resulting in 
splitting off 
Schisms develop in the organization 
between the ‘gang at work’ on one side 
and the rest of the organization on the 
other (fracturing of the organization 
between “asset heavy” and “asset 
light”) 
 
